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DOWN BANKRUPTCY LANE 
John D. Ayer* 
STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS 
USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. By Kevin J. Delaney. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 1992. Pp. ix, 213. $23. 
CORPORATE WELFARE. By Laurence H. Kallen. New York: Lyle 
Stuart. 1991. Pp. ix, 484. $24.95. 
A FEAST FOR LAWYERS/INSIDE CHAPTER 11: AN EXPOSE. By Sol 
Stein. New York: M. Evans & Co., Inc. 1989. Pp. xvii, 341. $19.95. 
"Were a cook to cook a fly, 
he would save the breast for himself." 
- Polish proverb 
Reading my way through a stack of books on the financial mess of 
the 1980s, I found my thoughts dwelling, not on retirees stripped of 
their pensions, not on women doubled up with pain from uterine dam-
age, not on aging shipyard workers with asbestosis gasping for breath, 
but on the two-handled cup that Hephaestus, the Master Craftsman, 
passes to Hera, his mother, at the end of Book I of Homer's Iliad. 
You may remember. Hera has been quarreling with Zeus, her hus-
band. Indeed, all the gods quarrel with each other, and their quarrels 
mirror the quarrels that so lacerate the peace among mortal men and 
women below. But with a difference. Mortals suffer in their quarrels, 
and sometimes die, and the dark earth closes over them. The gods 
may suffer from time to time, but it is a three-o'clock-in-the-afternoon 
suffering, like the misfortune that overcomes you when your favorite 
outfielder misses an easy pop-up in the first game of a doubleheader. 
It is all over by supper time. So here: Hephaestus offers the cup to 
Hera, to bring peace among the Olympians. Smiling she takes it. And 
then: 
Then dipping sweet nectar up from the mixing bowl 
he poured it round to all the immortals, left to right. 
And uncontrollable laughter broke from the happy gods 
as they watched the god of fire breathing hard 
and bustling through the halls. 
• That hour then 
• Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B. 1963, J.D. 1968, Louisville; 
LL.M. 1969, Yale. - Ed. Thanks to Joel Dobris, Ellen Jordan, and Nancy Rapoport for helpful 
comments and to David Arietta for research assistance. 
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and all day long till the sun went down they feasted 
and no god's hunger lacked a share of the handsome banquet 
or the gorgeous lyre Apollo struck or the Muses singing 
voice to voice in choirs, their vibrant music rising. 
At last, when the sun's fiery light had set, 
each immortal went to rest in his own house .... 1 
1585 
Passages like this are enough to convince you that Homer, whatever 
his skills as a theologian, could function pretty well as a social critic in 
our own time. It is as if there were two worlds out there:2 a world of 
light and a world of shade, a world of laughter and a world of tears. 
The world of shade is not necessarily populated by the pure in heart -
quite the contrary, its denizens take second place to no one in refrac-
tory meanness. But their aspirations are dignity itself compared to the 
frivolity of the gods. 
That, certainly, is how you feel after a steady diet of recent finan-
cial history. You get the feeling that there are two worlds out there 
still. There is one for the poor devils who suck little pieces of carcino-
genic fiber into their lungs or shove little threads of deadly plastic into 
their reproductive systems. There's another for the folks who manage 
the dispute-resolution system. 
Do not misunderstand. This is a Homeric, not a twentieth-century 
populist, world I am describing. It is an us-and-them world, but not 
necessarily a world of good guys and bad guys. Better call it a world 
of finishers and also-rans. The mortal victims are, well, victims, which 
is to say they have no special lock on purity or vision. They whine, 
they wallow in self-justification, and they are just as likely as not to 
make their own grab at the cookie jar whenever they get the chance. 
On the other hand, these Olympians, being Homeric, are not in the 
least way remote. Quite the contrary, they are all too familiar. You 
cannot blame it all on the big-time stock villains of the piece - the 
Charles Keatings, I van Boeskeys, Claiborne Robinses, the guys you 
love to hate, like the fellow in the silk hat and the pinstripes in the 
Monopoly game. No: this Olympus turns out to be peopled by whole 
tribes of string-pullers - or perhaps more precisely, symbol-manipu-
lators: the drifters and dreamers and Washington schemers who put it 
all together. Like their Homeric forebears, they tend to forget that 
they are gods sometimes. But at the end of the day, they are the ones 
who always seem to have a share at the banquet and a warm place to 
sleep. 
1. HOMER, ILIAD 98 (Robert Fagles trans., Viking 1990). 
2. I take the metaphors from CLYDE PHARR, HOMERIC GREEK: A BOOK FOR BEGINNERS 
168 (John Wright ed., 1985). 
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I 
Lawrence H. Kallen and Kevin J. Delaney,3 each the author of a 
new book that attempts to come to terms with this new age of bank-
ruptcy, are neither of them Homer, neither in theology nor in rhetori-
cal skill. Unlike as they may be to the Greek poet, they are equally 
unlike one another. Kallen is a practicing lawyer and bankruptcy 
trustee;4 Delaney is an academic sociologist. 5 In terms of coverage, 
Kallen paints with a broad if somewhat spattery brush while Delaney 
is a pointillist, zeroing in on just three cases. 
The differences are even more apparent in style. Kallen's is what 
you might call postmodernist goodfella; his muse would be someone 
on the order of the late Lee Atw~ter. Delaney does not write like a 
sociologist, exactly (for which thank heaven), but every sentence 
makes it clear that he is the man on the outside, with his notepad, his 
tape recorder, and a mind that is uncluttered, perhaps to a fault. Kal-
len's "explanations" run pretty much to the nudge-nudge-wink-wink 
variety, while everything seems problematic to Delaney. On the other 
hand, neither seems to have had the benefit of Lynn LoPucki's and 
William Whitford's splendid new academic study of megacases. 6 This 
is a pity, because the three taken together form a marvelous comple-
ment; taking their various strengths and weaknesses, you could pretty 
well triangulate the landscape. 
But be that as it may. Kallen, for his part, has given us a book that 
is fun to read7 and, for the lack of anything better, useful as a stimu-
lant for thinking about business failure in the past decade. Still, grant-
ing its virtues, it is a slack, lazy, casual sort of book that makes almost 
no effort to come to grips with issues that the author raises and ban-
dies about. The central difficulty, I think, is Kallen's maddening im-
3. I saw Delaney's work in draft and, at the publisher's request, wrote a blurb that I assume I 
will see staring back at me from the jacket of the published version. I intend no inconsistency 
between the blurb and this review, but to any reader who thinks he sees one, I offer two re-
sponses: (1) I liked the book, I really did; and (2) Samuel Johnson tells us that in lapidary 
inscriptions, a man is not upon oath. 
4. Laurence H. Kallen is Of Counsel with the firm Arnstein & Lehr, Chicago office. 
5. Kevin J. Delaney is Assistant Professor of Sociology, Temple University. 
6. See in particular Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's 
Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
125 (1990). This is perhaps understandable in the case of Kallen, whose book was probably in 
press before their work was published (although it was informally circulated for some months 
previously). It is less clear why Delaney does not cite it. 
7. Clearly, Kallen is striving for a place in that genre of business reporting that has produced 
so much instructive entertainment in the past decade. I am thinking of things like CONNIE 
BRUCKE, THE PREDATOR'S BALL (1988), and BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBAR!· 
ANS AT THE GATE: THE RISE AND FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990), and so forth - a species 
virtually unknown a decade ago. Has anyone noticed how much this new strain of business 
writing owes to our highly developed culture of sports journalism - and, come to think of it, 
how much the sports page has come to read like the business pages? Have we a new chapter in 
what Clifford Geertz has described as the blurring of genres? See CLIFFORD GEBRTZ, LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE 19-35 (1983). 
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precision with the "them" in his us-and-them. Oh, he names the 
villain clearly enough; !t is the "megacorporations" that have learned 
how to dominate the bankruptcy process at the expense of more or less 
everyone else-which is to say the (credulous?) reader, growing ever 
more indignant at each successive Kallen exposure. As a matter of 
fact, I think there is probably a fairly large kernel of truth in what he 
says. But as presented, it is so poorly formulated that it is almost 
impossible to make any consistent sense out of it. The difficulty is that 
"the megacorporation" turns out to be a far more elusive target than 
you might at first expect. It is a bit like the trickster in some fabulous 
folk tale who can take any shape,, any time, and still maintain his 
identity. 
In fairness to Kallen, it is remarkable just how protean his topic 
turns out to be - how easy it would be to write a comprehensive 
history of the 1980s from the standpoint of corporate disaster. Any-
one trying to tame this structural monster should be prepared to make 
some ruthless editorial exclusions. But Kallen's choices are particu-
larly odd. On the one hand, he wisely excludes almost everything 
about the "financial" bankruptcies8 - banks, savings and loans, and 
real estate - restricting himself to the more old-fashioned "value-ad-
ded" cases - blivets and widgets and the like. But in other ways, 
instead of trying to limit his job, he seems to expand it. You would 
think he had enough on his plate, what with Johns Manville (pp. 225-
302) and A.H. Robins (pp. 303-83), with Wickes (pp. 165-202) and 
Texaco (pp. 394-405). No. Kallen tempers his restraint so as to in-
clude an account of a great nonbankruptcy, the Chrysler bailout (pp. 
73-101 ). This may be justifiable on the grounds of size (but then again, 
why skip all the other great near-misses of the decade?). Less easy to 
justify are his own mini-histories of the oil cartels (pp. 17-30, 420-22) 
and the great Federal Reserve money crunch (pp. 111-20). 
His coverage of the bankruptcy cases themselves is also haphazard. 
LoPucki and Whitford count forty-three cases with assets of more 
than $100 million that had come to confirmation by March 31, 1988; 
of these Kallen mentions only seventeen, 9 and many of these seventeen 
get only perfunctory treatment. Indeed, if you take his treatment of 
A.H. Robins (80 pages10); Manville (77), Wickes (37), and the 
nonbankruptcy of Chrysler (28), you have something close to half the 
book (222 out of 475 pages). Concededly, if you had to pick four cases 
with which to tell the story of the 1980s, these certainly would be 
candidates. But you probably would not pick both Manville and Rob-
8. Technically not "bankruptcies," most of them, because financial institutions are nominally 
excluded from the toils or protections of the "bankruptcy" process. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 109 (1988). But you know what I mean. 
9. My count by comparing LoPucki/Whitford with Kallen's index. 
10. That is the principal treatment; there are other, scattered references as well. 
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ins for such a short selection: different as they are, they both stand or 
fall on their handling of the "mass-tort" issue, and by treating both of 
these at length, you necessarily shortchange other cases with distinc-
tive issues. So the selection leaves some enormous gaps, full of poten-
tially intriguing material. 
But when taken on his own terms, Kallen does seem to be right 
that the giant cases, at least by the end of the decade, had come to 
dominate the bankruptcy scene. Skeptics might crowd the data, of 
course: the total number of all chapter 1 ls filed actually declined to-
ward the end of the decade.11 And some number of cases - who can 
say what number? - avoid chapter 11 by out-of-court workout. 12 
You can equally well crowd the data the other way, of course: think 
of all those bank and insurance company restructurings that would be 
chapter 1 ls but for an accident of jurisdictional turfing. 13 Even setting 
all that aside, you still have the bald datum that the value of assets of 
public companies filing for bankruptcy relief had increased by approxi-
mately 4800 percent from 1980 to 1990.14 
Second, one is struck by the sheer pervasiveness of it all. Who 
among us, if we have (luckily) escaped asbestosis, pension collapse, or 
structural unemployment, has not - sometime in the decade - at 
least been stiffed on an airline ticket? At least from the end of the 
1930s to the end of the 1970s, bankruptcy seemed to be a subspecialty, 
a side show - a niche market, as the business school guys would call 
it. Lately, it has been wrapped into the fabric of the economy. 
A related point is how many of these cases seem to involve an 
attempt - successful or otherwise - to cadge some federal aid. This 
should not be surprising, when you stop to think about it. But you 
tend to forget that it is not just the S&L depositors who look to the 
Feds as their guarantor of last resort. Back at the beginning of the 
decade, Chrysler found solace in the warm embrace of the Treasury. 
11. It is not clear why this is so, but two possibilities seem worth exploring. One is the more 
aggressive attitude of the courts toward so-called "bad-faith" filing - roughly, cases filed with 
no hope of reorganization. See Albany Partners, Ltd. v. Westbrook (In re Albany Partners, 
Ltd.), 749 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984); Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc. v. Lamb (In re 
Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc.), 735 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1984). The other is the imposition 
of quarterly "maintenance" fees on chapter 11 estates. The maintenance fees may be small 
change to a Texaco or a Manville. But a typical chapter 11 case is Moe's Backhoe, where the 
assets are Moe and the backhoe. Quarterly fees may be enough to keep a case like that out of 
court altogether. 
12. Out-of-court workouts still occur, of course, but one might venture very tentatively that 
they are actually less common today than they might have been at other times. This is because of 
the absence of any dominant presence in the financial market to crack heads and bring the parties 
into line - a role played so effectively by J.P. Morgan in the nineteenth century, see generally 
RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 46-161 (1990), and to a limited extent in the 1980s by 
Michael Milken. See Roger Lowenstein & George Anders, No Picnic: Firms That Default Find 
Their Troubles May Have Just Begun, WALL ST. J. (Eastern ed.), Apr. 17, 1991, at A3. 
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) (describing who qualifies as a debtor). 
14. From $1.7 billion to $84.6 billion. Bankruptcy Explosion, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1990, at 
lB. 
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Manville sought and failed to receive federal assistance - and so, if 
you can believe it, did A.H. Robins. 15 The great pension cases, like 
LTV, are all about shifting social losses from the firm to the public 
fisc.16 And so it goes. 
A third point is somewhat more tentative and controversial. It is 
remarkable how many of the megabankruptcies seem to be tied to-
gether with one or another of two great social facts in our time. One 
- rather more specialized, but painfully important - is the explosion 
of product-related injuries, together with the attendant revolution in 
product liability law. I will come back to this later. The other- far 
more pervasive - is the disintegration of the old network of oligopo-
lies that sustained the American economy through so many comforta-
ble decades. 
Note that I did not presume to tag the Wall Street funny-money 
carousel - the takeover boom, or whatever you care to call it. The 
paper circus certainly is part of the story, and there is no doubt that an 
awful lot of investment bankers and their lackeys got pig rich while 
working stiffs were going broke (I will have more about the lackeys 
later). But to focus on the greed lobby seems to me, for analytical 
purposes, to miss the point. An ecological metaphor is in order here. 
Sure, the wolf killed the deer, but the one he killed was the slowest and 
least able to outrun him - in short, the sickliest. One reason there 
were so many sickly deer around is that they had spent so many gener-
ations isolated on the island, with no natural predator. 
I do not want to get carried away into a kind of vulgar Darwinism 
here. If I were a deer, I would take no comfort from the knowledge 
that I was playing a role in a great natural cycle, and there is abso-
lutely no chance that you would find me contributing to the Cervido-
Lupine Friendship Society. If a predator were about to take me out, I 
would do my best to plant a few hoofmarks somewhere near the base 
of his abdomen, and if I found him trying to gnaw his way out of a 
trap, the likelihood is dim that I would rush for the pliers. 
Still, if you can set aside your anti-Lupinism for a moment, you 
will be struck by how much of the bankruptcy boom can be traced to 
the decartelization of the older American economy. Steel is perhaps 
the most obvious example. Kallen gives more than passing attention 
15. See RONALD J. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS OF LmGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CoNTRO-
VERSY 38-39 (1990). 
16. It does not stop with megabankruptcies, of course. A friend who does a lot of farm 
bankruptcies was telling me lately about how they do farm workouts. The typical case involves 
one (or more) federal lenders on one side of the table, with the agent for the receiver of a failed 
bank on the other. The farmer's job is to sit in the middle and see how many crumbs he can grab 
as they go by. 
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to the big steel cases like LTV17 and Wheeling-Pittsburgh,· 18 he could 
easily have mentioned others.19 But it is not just coincidence that led 
so many steel companies to the door of the bankruptcy court. Rather, 
it is the result of structural changes in an industry no longer able to 
sell on terms that had held so favorably for so long. 
Among steel companies Wheeling-Pitt is, in many ways, the in-
structive case. By all accounts, Wheeling-Pitt fell victim to a fatal, but 
intelligible, management gamble. Crippled by an ancient plant, man-
agement took a flier on a first-class modem facility - and wound up 
without enough cash to service the debt.20 LTV's story is somewhat 
more complicated, but it carries the same general tenor (pp. 388-92). 
The two cases are alike in another important respect. That is, in 
each case the company had to come to terms with interests of its em-
ployees, both present (via their unions) and past (via the pension 
claims). In each case, the management strategy was the same: to cut 
the wage bill via concessions from the unions (if not otherwise)21 and 
to shift the pension liability to the public fisc.22 
One could apply a similar analysis to a lot of other great bankrupt-
cies of the 1980s - certainly in transport, which would include not 
17. LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 115 B.R. 760 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). For Kallen's treatment, see especially pp. 388-92. 
18. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986). 
For Kallen's treatment, see especially pp. 386-89. 
19. Somehow, he gives only passing mention to In re Sharon Steel Corp., Bankr. no. 87-207E 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. filed Apr. 17, 1987). P. 57. I think Sharon Steel fits the model sketched in the 
text, but the case is also noteworthy in that it involves the career of one of the more interesting 
villains of the bankruptcy drama - Victor Posner, who took center stage in two of the great 
cases of the 1980s (Sharon Steel and In re Evans Prods. Co., Bankr. nos. 85-0012-BKC-TCB 
through 85-00519-BKC-TCB inclusive (Bankr. S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 11, 1985)) and, by all appear-
ances, got pretty well trimmed both times. See infra text accompanying notes 72-81. Kallen also 
mentions In re McLouth Steel Corp., Bankr. no. 81-07001-w (Bankr. E.D. Mich. filed Mar. 1, 
1982). P. 57. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, mention McLouth Steel and also In re Phoenix 
Steel Corp., Bankr. no. 83-290 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Aug. 12, 1983). 
20. Pp. 384-88. See generally Tim Peek, Why Wheeling-Pitt Strategy Failed, PnT. Bus. 
TIMES & J., Oct. 7, 1985, § 1, at 1. Less charitable appraisers may argue that management let 
itself get carried away by the chrome and lustre of all that fancy new hardware. This approach is 
consistent with the theory that the surviving farmers are not those with the fancy new equip-
ment, but those who hang onto their 1949 tractors, together with a good supply of bobby pins 
and glue. 
21. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791F.2d1074 (3d Cir. 
1986). Kallen observes that the LTV unions proved more compliant, actuated by the Wheeling-
Pitt example. P. 391. 
22. Wheeling-Pitt seems to have been more successful at this than LTV, probably because it 
came along earlier and its claim was smaller. See pp. 388, 390-91; cf. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2668 (1990). J,.TV's ultimate liability remains unclear at this 
writing. 
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only the airlines23 but also bus24 and trucking companies.25 The same 
could be said about the great shakeout in financial services, although 
this is mostly beyond the scope of either Kallen's or Delaney's book.26 
Both Kallen and Delaney tell part of the story of this decartelization 
- Kallen interstitially and throughout, Delaney through a case study 
of the Continental Airlines failure, which may be the pivotal labor-
driven reorganization case. Here I think Delaney is much more help-
ful. Continental is certainly the most notorious and possibly the most 
successful of the great union-busting bankruptcies, full of all the pas-
sions and recriminations you would expect in such a life-or-death bat-
tle. 27 And I think Delaney does a useful job of laying out the 
landscape, giving you the information you need to understand the 
constraints. 
Thus, Delaney recounts how Continental filed while still cash-flow 
positive, in the midst of a bitter campaign to scale down union wages, 
and how, at the end of the day, the unions lay broken while Continen-
tal was still flying (pp. 105-12). But while both Delaney and Kallen 
give you the material to develop a perspective on the case, neither re-
ally comes to grips with the central issue. In Continental, as in so 
many of these cases, the firm simply did not have the cash flow suffi-
cient to cope with present and prospective claims. You can see this 
easily enough with some simple numerical examples. Suppose a firm 
earns $2 per year. Suppose it needs $1.50 a year for current operating 
costs and $1.50 a year to pay debt service. You run into the first rule 
of bankruptcy economics: three into two won't go. This equation is, it 
seems to me, basic. It does not follow, of course, that this is the end of 
all analysis over pro rata shares. Quite the contrary: it seems it is the 
beginning. But it is a beginning at which Kallen and Delaney, for 
whatever reasons, never quite arrive. 
23. See Kallen's discussion of the Eastern Air Lines (pp. 405-12) and Continental Air Lines 
(pp. 214-24). Delaney treats the Continental failure at pp. 82-125. The history of regulated 
international air transport is told in ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY (1984). 
24. Kallen gives only passing mention to Greyhound, wl;lere, to be fair, most of the action 
has taken place since bis publication cutoff date. Pp. 432, 441, 446. 
25. Trucking, which bas involved a lot of small carriers, is excusably beyond the scope of 
Kallen's book. It would be interesting to trace the relationship between the transport bankrupt-
cies of the 1980s and the classic railroad reorganizations that underlay American economic de-
velopment from the end of the Civil War until the beginning of World War II. 
26. Kallen makes passing mention of the great "nonbankruptcy" of Continental Illinois 
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago. See pp. 25, 140, 141, 148, 153, 213; see also GARY HEC-
TOR, BREAKING THE BANK: THE DECLINE OF BANKAMERICA (1988); MARTIN MAYER, THE 
GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY (1990). 
27. Come to think of it, you could write a fairly good economic history of the 1980s by 
focusing on the disintegration of traditional organized labor. From this perspective, the critical 
case probably is not Continental but the battle between the federal government and the Profes-
sional Air Traffic Controllers (PATCO). The government, of course, did not have to go into 
bankruptcy to accomplish its objective - but in the end, the union did. See United States v. 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 653 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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That is why it has always seemed so pointless to talk about the 
labor bankruptcies in terms of whether the entity is "really" bankrupt, 
whatever that may mean. Similarly, it seems to me equally irrelevant 
to talk about the question of whether the statute "permits," or does 
not permit, the company to repudiate its labor contract(s) in bank-
ruptcy. In one sense, rejection is always "permitted": the company 
can always reject its contract the way any firm can always reject any 
contract - by simply going out of business. Moreover, quite apart 
from bankruptcy, the company may repudiate its contract - but it 
must bear the penalty for breach. The point is that a firm that repudi-
ates its contract in bankruptcy is likewise liable to sanction - indeed, 
to the same sanctions that it would bear outside of bankruptcy.28 In 
this respect, the labor contract is no different from any other executory 
contract.29 
We could, of course, write a statute that prohibited repudiation in 
bankruptcy (or outside bankruptcy, for that matter). But such a stat-
ute wouldn't really be a contract statute at all; it would be a priority 
statute, mandating that all the cash flow of the firm go first to satisfy 
labor claims, until the cupboard was bare. For the moment, I am not 
taking a position on the wisdom of such a statute, but I do think it is 
essential that we call it what it is. We have plenty of priority statutes 
on the books, inside bankruptcy and out - sometimes even for wage 
claimants. 30 Or we could do what in fact was done: we could provide 
for a kind of institutionalized bumper cars, in which the parties get to 
contend under certain rules, with the sovereign seeking not to take a 
position as to the proper result. This is a standard way of doing social 
business - particularly, of course, in labor law - and again, it is not 
my purpose to say that it is a good or bad one. It does seem to me to 
have the virtue of addressing the right issue.3 1 
28. See Air Line Pilot Assn. Intl. v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (In re Continental Airlines 
Corp.), 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990). Concededly, in a case like Continental, the "remedy" 
turns out to be an empty shell. But that does not vitiate my point; what the union wanted was 
not "damages" so much as the (prospective) relationship. On the structure of the Bankruptcy 
Code's executory contract provision, see generally Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in 
Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 845 (1988). 
29. It is ancient history now, but I cannot resist the impulse to hearken back to what seems 
to me a crucial wrong turn in the history of labor contract law. I am speaking of the basic 
premise that a labor contract is within the class of contracts envisioned by Bankruptcy Code 
§ 365. The unions contested this one in the early labor cases; they lost and gave up. I wonder if 
they gave up too easily. I suspect that part of their problem arose from an imperialist tendency 
in contracts scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s that tended to insist on the similarities (and 
obscure the differences) between agreements of different sorts. See, chiefly, Clyde W. Summers, 
Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969). I concede that this is a 
bit like asking what would have happened if the women's movement, instead of choosing to 
campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, had concentrated its energy on 
persuading the courts that its provisions were already in there. 
30. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988) (wage priority). 
31. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND 
CoLLECTIVE BARGINING (1976). 
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There are other industries afilicted by bankruptcy where the "rent-
seeking"32 model may not appear to fit so well. Meatpacking33 is one 
example; another, more important, is retailing.34 And of course, the 
one that has so far escaped major bankruptcy: the auto industry.35 
But the similarities may outweigh the differences. Neither meatpack-
ing nor retail ever enjoyed the kind of protection that propped up the 
steel industry or the transport firms. But both fell victim to long-term 
changes in consumer taste and in product distribution that undercut 
the cash-flow potential from long-established patterns of behavior. 
And for both, as for the auto industry, their long-term advantage may 
have depended more on artificial barriers to competition than a first 
glance would tell. 
The consequences of oligopolistic behavior also appear in less obvi-
ous places. For example, it has been a long time since Texas oilmen 
enjoyed the privileges of a closed market. 36 But no one can doubt that 
the Texas oil boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s was a free ride on 
the OPEC cartel - and that the cartel's disintegration brought about 
their fall. 
This is no more than a sketch, of course: ours is a vast economy 
with an almost infinite variety of misfortunes, and parts of the bank-
ruptcy story do not fit this model well at all. Computer start-ups, for 
example. 37 Or Atlantic City real estate. But one class of cases that 
does deserve special attention is cases involving product liability, or 
"mass tort." 
II 
Unlike the "oligopoly/downsizing" cases, the mass tort cases are 
32. See Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking Activities, 90 J. POL. 
EcON. 988 (1982). 
33. For Kallen's discussion of Wilson Foods, see pp. 212-14. 
34. The crest of the retail bankruptcy tide did not hit until after Kallen's publication date, 
but he does devote a long and useful chapter to the Wickes Companies - including a plug for his 
own walk-on role. Pp. 165-202. On the agonies of adjustment in retail generally, see ISADORE 
BARMASH, MACY'S FOR SALE (1989), and DONALD R. KATZ, THE BIG STORE: INSIDE THE 
CRISIS AND REVOLUTION AT SEARS (1987). 
35. See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING (1986); BROCK YATES, THE DE-
CLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1983). 
36. Although there certainly was a time. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE (1991). 
37. Kallen gives brief attention to the death and attempted resurrection of Osborne Com-
puter Corporation, but he fails to develop the moral: computer companies do not reorganize. 
Pp. 160-62. In a developing, dynamic market, where products depend on strong warranty sup-
port, a single misstep will put you out of the race. Moreover, most of the dramatic success stories 
here depend on creative flair. If there is any talent left after the first strike, the lucky repositories 
of that spark can pretty well walk away and try their luck elsewhere, mostly unencumbered by 
the prior failure. Cf PAUL H. LANG, GEORGE FRIDERIC HANDEL 541 (1966) (recounting com-
poser's artistic and financial successes and failures, but reporting "no evidence that he was ever 
close to 'bankruptcy.'"). 
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few in number, concentrated mostly in the asbestos industry,38 with 
the addition of the A.H. Robins case involving the intrauterine contra-
ceptive device, the Dalkon Shield. 39 Both Kallen and Delaney discuss 
Manville at length (Delaney, pp. 60-81; Kallen, pp. 225-302). Kallen 
also gives an extensive account of Robins (pp. 303-83). For more de-
tail on Robins, Ronald Bacigal has given us a chronology that is useful 
and precise, if almost entirely opaque. 40 
For all their differences, these "mass tort" cases together take their 
provenance from two social facts. The first is the creation of a techni-
cal or economic structure to produce and distribute products with the 
capacity to do grievous harm.41 The other is the development of a 
system of liability rules that seeks to transfer the cost of the misfortune 
from the ultimate victim to someone further up the technostructural 
chain. 42 The strictly "bankruptcy" wrinkle is, at best, an incidental 
stage and, as we shall see, by no means a necessary one. 
One is hard put to think of any species of litigation more driven by 
undeserved human suffering. Too, both the Manville and Robins 
cases brimmed over with anger and frustration and no small sense of 
moral outrage. How could it have been otherwise? In both cases, le-
gions of victims suffered real pain and many died wretched and ago-
nizing deaths, often leaving dependent survivors in penury. 
Yet here even more than in the labor cases, almost all discussion 
founders on analytical confusion. As with the oligopoly cases, this is 
easy enough to see if you start with a simple example.43 Suppose the 
debtor has assets that would be worth $6 if they are kept together in a 
going concern, or $5 if they were broken up and sold for scrap.44 Sup-
pose there are "present" (liquidated, noncontingent) claims of $10, 
and "future"45 (unliquidated, contingent) claims of $3. How shall we 
38. Asbestos bankruptcies include Manville, UNR, and Amatex. On Manville, see infra text 
accompanying note 51. On UNR, see In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984). On 
Amatex, see In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 {3d Cir. 1985). 
39. See infra text accompanying notes 49-61. 
40. BACIGAL, supra note 15. Another work on Robins that came to my attention too lnte for 
discussion here is RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON 
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991). 
41. As has often been pointed out, this structure accounts for the growth of the modem tort 
law system taken as a whole, possibly together with other modem social institutions - such as 
the limited liability corporation. 
42. George Priest has remarked that the two great judicial revolutions of our time have been 
in tort law and public school desegregation. George L. Priest, Commentary, in Fred R. Shapiro, 
The Most-Cited Articles from The Yale Law Journal 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1470 (1991). 
43. The discussion in this paragraph draws heavily on David Gray Carlson's important arti· 
cle, David G. Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertem-
poral Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic-Waste 
Cleanup, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 119. 
44. In both cases, I am assuming that the number represents the market's best guess as to the 
present value of all prospective future income streams. Cf. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEW ART 
L. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 62-66 {3d ed. 1988). 
45. I adopt the standard jargon here, although it is premised on an analytical confusion all its 
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distribute the assets? In particular, how shall we treat these "future" 
claims? I think there are powerful arguments that the drafters of the 
1978 Code intended to include "future" claims within the definition of 
"claim" for bankruptcy purposes.46 But many courts have been un-
willing to construe it that way.47 Strictly as a pragmatic matter, one 
can hardly blame them. The practical problems of definition and ad-
ministration are enough to inhibit even the most self-confident judge. 
But forget about the judges for the moment. What are the implica-
tions of the decision on this issue? Put it this way: if you represented 
the "present" claimants, what would be your strategy for "reorganiz-
ing" this estate? Your first impulse is to try to exclude the "future" 
claimants from the case, and to save the going concern values, giving 
each "present" claimant 60¢ on the dollar. On second thought, how-
ever, it becomes clear that this will not work, because no one will pay 
the going concern value of $6 for assets with a gross value of $6 if they 
are still encumbered by "future" claims of $3. It might seem sensible 
to let the "future" claimants into the pool, preserving the going con-
cern values; then everyone would get 46¢ on the dollar (6/13 -
rounded oft). ·But remember, we are considering all this from the 
standpoint of the "present" claimants. From their standpoint, it is 
still desirable to keep the future claimants out of the pool, even if it 
means defeating any prospect of a going concern sale, because they are 
worse off including the future claimants to get the going concern sale 
than they would be excluding the future claimants and sharing in the 
"liquidation" pot-from which they would get 50¢ on the dollar (5/ 
10).48 
It is a fair inference that these numbers present an accurate charac-
terization of the underlying dynamics in both the Manville and Robins 
. bankruptcies. Under these circumstances, you had to have some sort 
of collective proceeding for orchestrating the competing claims -
otherwise, the early claimants would have simply gobbled up the es-
tate before the later claimants got anything. This is a simple matter of 
own. In the strict sense, if a claim is a future claim, then a claim is not a claim now, and is 
thereby ineligible to participate in the bankruptcy estate. But this analysis would decide the issue 
before it begins. The question, rather, is whether a claim, though "future" in some sense, is 
nonetheless "present" in another sense - sufficiently so to permit the claimholder to participate 
in the bankruptcy estate. 
46. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1978). The authoritative discussion is Mark J. 
Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); see also Alan Schwartz, Prod-
uct Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: The Unknowable Risk Relationship, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985). ' 
47. For holdings that contingent tort claims are not "claims" within § 101(4), see In re 
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476 (N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Amatex Coip., 30 B.R. 309 
(E.D. Pa. 1983), affd. on opinion below, 37 B.R. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1983), revd. on other grounds, 155 
F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR, 29 B.R. 741 (N.D. Ill~ 1983), appeal dismissed, 125 F.2d 
1111 (7th Cir. 1984). 
48. The logic behind this example is elegantly developed, in Carlson, supra note 43. 
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arithmetic, and no amount of fulmination about corporate malfea-
sance and attorney greed will make it go away. 
The difficulty (as events have amply proved) was that nobody had 
any idea how to do the valuation. Both Judge Lifland (in Manville) 
and Judge Merhige (in Robins) did everything they could to avoid ad-
dressing the problem.49 Merhige ultimately picked a number; whether 
he did right or not probably depends more on your view of his han-
dling of the case in toto than it does on your appraisal of how he 
weighed the valuation evidence. so Lifland, who had an even harder 
job, bought a solution that pretended to sidestep the problem 
altogether. 51 
As we know now, it did not work. The Manville settlement trust 
unravelled completely, and the Robins trust is showing signs of 
strain. 52 Difficult times invite daring solutions; in Manville, the case 
careened around a sliarp new turn when District Judge Jack Weinstein 
from the Eastern District of New York took control to try to do the 
deal anew.53 By any conventional measure, there really is not the 
slightest basis for Weinstein to be in the case. But no one was ready to 
tolerate the cratering of the original Manville trust, and Weinstein had 
a reputation as a head-cracking pusher for settlement.54 
49. It is worth noting that Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, who is nobody's idea of a 
patsy, wrote the opinion dismissing the appeal in UNR, even as he felt impelled to unburden 
himself with an essay on how he felt the matter ought to be handled. See In re UNR, Inc., 725 
F.2d 1111, 1118-20 (7th Cir. 1984). Ronald Bacigal shows how in A.H. Robins Judge Merhige, 
surely as intrusive as any judge on the bench, nearly bent himself double in an unsuccessful effort 
to promote settlement on this issue. See BACIGAL, supra note 15, at 98-110. Amy Singer shows 
Judge Lifland adopting a similar strategy in Manville. See Amy Singer, Leon Silverman $4.5m,• 
His Clients$???, AM. LAW., Oct. 1990, at 58. 
50. That is, a reader ofBacigal's account comes away with the sense that Merhige thought it 
was time for the case to end, and that he picked a number that he felt would end it - or at least 
not obstruct its conclusion. See Bacigal, supra note 15, at 107-10. One assumes that Merhige 
believed he was implementing sound public policy, but a world of tort victims (and their lawyers) 
would take a different view. 
51. Lifland's job was harder in the respect that the dimensions of "unknown" were greater. 
In Robins, one could get at least some fix on who the claimants were; the real issue was how 
badly they had suffered, or would suffer. In Manville the participants had to cope not only with 
the problem of unknown claims, but also of unknown claimants - the statistical certainty that 
persons in a defined group would someday show symptoms of asbestosis, even though no one 
knew which ones yet. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 628-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1986). 
52. Milo Geyelin, Legal Morass: Da/kon Shield Trust, Hailed as Innovative, Stirs a Lot of 
Discord, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1991, at 1. On the Manville settlement trust, see generally Robert 
B. McKay, Asbestos Property Damage Settlement in a Bankruptcy Setting, LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 37; Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Per· 
sonal Injury Settlement Trust, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 27. On Dalkon 
Shield, see Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 175. 
53. Early stages of the Weinstein takeover are described in Singer, supra note 49, at 66-67. 
54. Weinstein's reputation was based in large part on his work in the Agent Orange case -
another mass tort case (though not a bankruptcy case) where the settlement may not have 
achieved everyone's aspirations. In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), modified 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). See generally PETER H. ScmJCK, 
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At this writing, it is not clear whether even Judge Weinstein's Arti-
cle III firepower will be sufficient to put the problem behind us. What 
do become clear, however, are the management problems that, if they 
exist in the bankruptcy system, at least transcend the bankruptcy sys-
tem, and are troublesome enough to tax the wits of the cleverest and 
most resourceful district judges. Thus, Judge Weinstein's solution to 
the Manville problem is, in effect, a national, limited resource class 
action. The irony is that this is just what bankruptcy is - a national 
limited resource class action. 55 
Aside from the problem of claims management, both these cases 
raise issues of culpability. There is a lot of human suffering in each 
case, and in both there are plenty of recriminations - plenty of de-
mand from the victims and their advocates that the wrongdoers be 
identified and punished. This is particularly important in Robins; in 
Manville, responsibility may have been diluted over generations and 
across the industry. Robins seems rather different. In addition to 
Kallen's work there are a number of accounts of various phases of the 
Dalkon imbroglio. Some of them are driven by old-fashioned populist 
rage. 56 Others are relatively dispassionate. 57 But even in the blandest 
of the accounts, there is so much evidence of callousness, of sheer 
bloody-mindedness both in the events that led up to the shield's re-
lease and the ensuing litigation, that it's hard not to sympathize with 
those who wanted the Robins family tucked into a sack with a monkey 
and a snake and tossed into the Bosphorous. 
Most of those presentations do, however, lack another feature es-
sential to a real work of art: dramatic unity. Judge Miles Lord, who 
presided over the immediate prebankruptcy phase of the Dalkon 
Shield case, offers a model of recriminatory adjudication. He func-
tioned more like a Roman tribune, protecting the plebs from the patri-
cians. Clearly, when Robins filed for bankruptcy relief at Richmond, 
the dominant motive must have been to escape Lord's anti-Robins 
grudge match. 
Whether the Robins family got what it wanted out of the bank-
ruptcy filing is an interesting question. The record reveals instances of 
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE CoURTS (1986); Harvey P. 
Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, 53 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
1990, at 49; Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange 
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1986). 
55. Strictly speaking, a worldwide limited resource class action. The Code puts no territorial 
limitations either on claims or on property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4), 541 (1988). 
56. SUSAN ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LoRD'S JUSTICE: ONE JUDGE'S BATILE 
TO EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD l.U.D. {1985); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY CoST: 
CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); SUSAN PERRY & JIM DAW-
SON, NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985). 
57. See BACIGAL, supra note 15. Bacigal carries the story through late 1989, when the Shield 
victims began to get compensation from the fund. His book was published before the more 
recent complaints about the administration of the fund. 
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what sound like almost shameless partisanship on the part of Judge 
Merhige for his friends and good neighbors.58 Clearly Merhige re-
fused every invitation to turn the case into anything like a criminal 
proceeding. In the end the Robins family is still enjoying the good life, 
with its country club dues paid, while many of the victims go uncom-
pensated and even untreated. 
But I remember hearing in my youth about the judge who was 
"nonpartisan - he hates everybody - and even-tempered - he's al-
ways mad." I do not suppose Merhige deserves quite so dismissive an 
epithet, but it does seem that Merhige's "injudiciousness~' (if you can 
call it that) was a good deal more - shall we say even-handed? -
than Lord's; or, put differently, at 0-1e time or another he seems to 
have stepped on just about everyone's feet. 59 He's an Article III judge, 
remember, and those guys do not have to listen to anybody. If Mer-
hige showed consistent favoritism to the views Qf any one person, that 
person was Merhige himself. From early on he seems to have had a 
fairly well-articulated view of how the case should go, and he was not 
going to let anyone distract him from getting there. 60 
What, exactly, was that view? One has to do some guessing here, 
but I think perhaps the record (as summarized by Kallen) does suggest 
a coherent story. That is, I suspect that Merhige had a genuine inter-
est in seeing that this litigational pig moved through the judicial py-
thon in the quickest, most economical manner. He did want to see 
that valid claims were paid. 61 On the other hand, he undoubtedly had 
a good deal of skepticism about the justice of large personal injury 
awards, plus a bit of impatience with the plaintiff's bar. As to the 
Robins family, his attitude is harder to peg. Perhaps - though it is 
hard to imagine how - he thought they were just good people caught 
in an unfortunate net. Perhaps he figured that any attempt at recrimi-
nation would be a counterproductive distraction and that the Bank-
ruptcy Code did not provide for it anyway. 
"Closure" is a goal for any judge in any case. But it seems a not 
entirely unworthy goal for judges like Merhige and Lifland for any 
number of reasons. For one, there clearly were victims, and a primary 
goal was to get them paid - a goal that always stood in jeopardy as 
SS. But see In re Diana R. Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 828 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Mer-
hige's referring to E.C. Robins as "a neighbor" and a "fine man" did not constitute a reasonable 
basis for questioning Merhige's impartiality). 
S9. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. SSS (E.D. Va. 1988). 
60. I remember an instructive conversation with an unusually able newspaper reporter who 
was a careful student of the Dalkon Shield case and had also covered Judge Merhige's campaign 
to integrate the Richmond Schools. See Bradley v. School Bd., 317 F. Supp. SSS (E.D. Va. 
1970). He said he remembered having no problem with Merhige's aggressive case management 
as long as the victims were the old Southern segregationists, but that he had begun to have 
doubts once he saw how that kind of power could cut both ways. 
61. Up to a point. One class of potential claimants who seem to have taken nothing from the 
case are the users (past and, unfortunately, present) outside the United States. 
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long as the parties kept wrangling. 62 And of course the meter is al-
ways running in these cases - the lawyers and the accountants, the 
investment bankers, and heaven knows who else want to get paid. De-
lay always means more money in the pockets of the professionals. 
But closure takes on a special significance in a case like this be-
cause the litigation raises all sorts of public issues in our society that 
are important, divisive, and, as a matter of public policy, unresolved. I 
have mentioned a couple along the way, but a detailed recitation is 
warranted here. Consider, for example, the whole question of propri-
ety of the personal injury tort system, the propriety of contingent fees, 
of punitive damages, of lawyer advertising, of the proper role of the 
judge in managing litigation. The issues are urgent enough, and in the 
nature of things, when we get an issue too tough for anything ap-
proaching general consensus, we tend to dump it in the lap of a judge. 
Under the circumstances, we should thank our lucky stars for anyone 
who handles these issues with any finesse at all, without expecting 
more. 
It would be useful if Kallen, Delaney, or any of the other writers in 
this field offered· any real help in sorting these problems out. On the 
other hand, just to identify them suggests how difficult they must be. 
And inventorying the Aegean stable seems to be a worthwhile accom-
plishment, even if you cannot cleanse it. 63 
III 
The breakup of the oligopolies and the "mass torts" appear to be 
the two most obvious themes to find in the megabankruptcies of the 
1980s. The other cases that figure in Kallen's account64-call them 
the "routine" megabankruptcies - are at once more simple and more 
complex. They are more simple in that none presents an issue quite as 
pervasive or intractable as the matter of "unknown claims" liability in 
the context of an absolutely insolvent debtor. They are more complex 
in the sense that they raise too many· other issues for anything like 
simple generalization, much less resolution. Kallen tends to dismiss 
them all with conclusory fulmination about the evils of "the corpora-
tion," without ever explaining just what that sort of reference might 
mean. 
Take the Wickes affair~ for example (pp. 165-202). I have no quar-
rel with Kallen's general outline: here was a massive conglomerate 
62. Merhige did get shot down on his one effort to provide some sort of succor here. Under 
entreaty from the plaintiff's bar, he ordered "preliminary payment" of some claims as kind of a 
triage damage scheme. Alas for pragmatism, the Fourth Circuit overturned his scheme, holding 
that the statute did not give him the power to do what he had done. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 
F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
63. See Myres S. McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 
YALE L.J. 827 (1941). 
64. Or that belong there, even if he happened to overlook them. 
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(mostly in retailing) with enormous debt problems (apparently in large 
part from one big ill-chosen acquisition). It got "reorganized" thanks 
to some smoke-and-mirror financing, together with maximum deploy-
ment of its tax losses. Kallen dismisses it all as "corporate welfare," 
with a couple of snarly asides about the tax advantage (p. 201). Now, 
it may well be that the tax treatment of business losses is improper. 
But it is not obviously the case; the issue is a fairly complex question 
of tax policy on which, per custom, Kallen does not trouble to en-
lighten us. 
Meanwhile, Kallen fails to come to grips with the fact that the 
driving force behind the Wickes chapter 11 was the body of unpaid 
creditors, who brought in Sanford Sigiloff as the turnaround angel to 
put the plan together. LoPucki and Whitford report that Wickes had 
no fewer than sixteen impaired classes, 65 making it one of the most 
complex cases, in terms of debt structure, of the 1980s or any other 
decade. They estimate that unsecureds got better than 80¢ on the dol-
lar66 and that, taking equity and unsecured debt together, equity got 
only 5.7% of the payout.67 You could say that equity was a winner 
here in the sense that it didn't deserve anything at all. But as all the 
evidence suggests, this is fairly standard stuff. 68 Meanwhile it seems 
abundantly clear that the creditors were happy with Sigiloff and his 
result. If he was overpaid, they were hardly in a position to complain, 
nor were they interested. 69 
Kallen gives little or no attention to other megabankruptcies that 
seem to complicate any thesis that he may be trying to articulate here. 
Thus, he gives only perfunctory attention to what is surely one of the 
most interesting bankruptcies of the decade, not only in substance but 
in execution - that of Baldwin-United, the onetime piano company 
that prefigured the rash of bank and insurance failures that have over-
taken us more recently (pp. 157-60). The importance of Baldwin may 
lie precisely in how easily we have forgotten it - a case of immense 
complexity and considerable public consequence that was in and out 
of court with relative speed and efficiency.70 
Perhaps even more surprisingly, Kallen only mentions incidentally 
65. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 140 (fable II). 
66. Actually, 81.6%, making it the best payout to unsecureds of all "insolvent" cases in their 
analysis. See id. at 142 (fable III). 
67. Id. 
68. For more on the "equity slice" in insolvent cases, see infra notes 71-80 and accompany-
ing text. 
69. LoPucki and Whitford report that the only dissenting class in Wickes was the class of 
creditors holding securities fraud claims. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 140 (fable II). 
Indeed, they identify securities fraud claimants as dissenters in six of their major cases - a 
fascinating datum that I hope they discuss more as they continue to analyze their data. 
70. See Steve Nelson, Baldwin-United: The System Can Work, LEGAL TIMES, Mar, 17, 
1986, at 1. 
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what may be the most interesting case of the decade - In re Evans 
Products, 71 the only major case of the 1980s where the court actually 
took control away from an active equity interest and imposed a credi-
tor cramdown plan that wiped out shareholders altogether. Evans has 
passed into the folklore as "a watershed case,"72 though I suspect it 
may be rather more of a sport, combining an unusually unsympathetic 
judge with a corporate raider whom more or less everyone loved to 
hate. 73 But if Kallen were really interested in the possibility of crisp 
(brutal?) administration, presumably he would want at least to inquire 
into what happened there. 14 
Baldwin and Evans are important to Kallen's inquiry because they 
both suggest a lot about a theme dear to his heart - the role of the 
judge. Randall J. Newsome, as presiding judge in the Baldwin affair, 
was thirty-three years old with less than a year's experience when he 
took over Baldwin. Yet he receives credit from nearly all the partici-
pants for having maintained the kind of discipline necessary to move 
the case to a quick conclusion. 75 In Evans, the determining factor was 
an act of the late Judge Thomas C. Britton that was almost unprece-
dented in major bankruptcy cases: he terminated the debtor's exclu-
sivity period and let creditors file their own plan. 76 Britton was also 
famous for cutting fees.77 The contrast between Britton's tight-fisted 
procreditor stance and Lifland's more tolerant posture seems to have 
resulted in some extraordinary venue-shopping when Eastern Air 
Lines leveraged itself into Lifland's Manhattan court rather than Brit-
ten's in Miami.78 
Evans was not the only debtor wipeout among major bankruptcies 
in the 1980s. Victor Posner, the Miami-based investor who controlled 
Evans, did almost equally badly with another of his investment ideas, 
71. 65 B.R. 870 (S.D. Fla.), ajfg. 65 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); cf. In re Evans Prods. 
Co., 62 B.R. 173 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986). Kallen mentions Evans Products on p. 57. 
72. Shareholder Recoveries Get Squeezed in Chapter 11, CoRP. FINANCING WK., Nov. 19, 
1990, at 1. 
73. The judge is Thomas Britton, now deceased. The raider is Victor Posner, who owned a 
controlling stake in the equity of Evans, and who contested the plan until the end. Posner seems 
also to have taken a beating on his equity stake in the bankruptcy of Sharon Steel. 
74. Suggesting that the 1990s will not be the decade of the debtor, one commentator points to 
the role of the new arbitrageur-creditors who traffic in distressed debt. They are, this observer 
says, "far less image conscious - they do not have the white-shoe, gentlemanly workout orienta-
tion of commercial banks, previously the biggest creditors in bankruptcies." See Shareholder 
Recoveries Get Squeezed in Chapter 11, supra note 72, at 1 (quoting John Mueller, vice president 
of Whitman Heffernan Rhein & Co.). 
75. See Nelson, supra note 70, at 1. 
76. See Rosalind Resnick, Bankruptcy Lawyers Lase a Foe in Florida, NATL. L.J., Feb. 19, 
1990, at 3. 
77. Id. 
78. Eva M. Rodriguez, Eastern Lands On Friendlier Legal Te"ain: How Airliner Got the 
Bankruptcy Judge It Wanted, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 27, 1989, at 1. 
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Sharon Steel, after he took it into bankruptcy in Pennsylvania. 79 The 
Davis brothers of Texas lost everything in a creditor plan for their oil 
field supply empire, Kenda vis Industries. 8° Kallen mentions Sharon 
only in passing (p. 57), and the Davis brothers not at all.81 
Cases like Wickes, Evans, and Baldwin-United, whatever their 
other features, do have in common that they deployed the bankruptcy 
process in a fairly conventional manner. Others have questioned 
whether the mass tort or the labor cases deserve the same characteri-
zation. I have tried to show that they do. On the other hand, all this 
discussion helps to clarify the focus on what seems to me to be the 
strangest of all the megabankruptcies: the case of Texaco. Kallen 
gives a quick summary of Texaco (pp. 394-405), and Delaney gives it 
one of his three major chapters. The outline is easy to recall. Pennzoil 
got a judgment against Texaco in a Texas state court, to the tune of 
$10.5 billion. The verdict was monstrous by any measure and almost 
certainly far more than Pennzoil ever expected to win. After a good 
deal of chaffering, Texaco filed for chapter 11 relief. After still more 
give-and-take, the parties settled the case for $3 billion. 
Seemingly every business writer has something to say about Tex-
aco, and no wonder: it is a monster case. 82 Plenty of people, including 
Kallen and Delaney, treat it as somehow a novelty. But no one, so far 
as I am concerned, comes down on the point hard enough. For if ever 
there was a case that did not belong in bankruptcy, at least by any 
conventional standard, it is this one. Exact measures are slippery, but 
think of it this way: Pennzoil's $10.5 billion verdict almost certainly 
exceeded everyone's expectations; in any event, Pennzoil never acted 
like it expected to collect it in full. Meanwhile, Texaco's stock market 
capitalization at the time of the verdict was something in excess of $10 
billion, falling to $8.5 billion before the case began. 83 
Suppose the parties settled on a sum of $5 billion - a little under 
half the original verdict, and more than half again as much as the final 
payoff in fact. The point is that even on these numbers, Texaco would 
have remained solvent before, during, and after the deal. In other 
79. See Jn re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989); Sharon Steel Pact Reached, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at D4; Sharon Steel Trustee, Creditors Reach Accord, UPI, Nov. 15, 
1990 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File). 
80. See Davis Loses in Court, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1986, § 3, at 1. In general, wounded Texas 
oil barons found relatively little solace in the bankruptcy court. See Movers and Shakers Shaken 
Up in Texas, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. 
81. In fairness, Kendavis was only a "mini-mega" bankruptcy, with liabilities of only $500 
million. 
82. Comparisons are always inexact, but I suspect the only modern-day case that deserves 
comparison is the Penn Central bankruptcy of the early 1970s. See generally Walter H. Brown, 
Jr., Introduction: A Review of the Penn Central Reorganization Proceeding, 36 Bus. LAW. 1903 
(1981). 
83. The figures are summarized in Lawrence Summers & David Cutler, Texaco and Pennzoil 
Both Lost Big, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1988, § 3, at 3. 
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words, the company was never "bankrupt" in any conventional sense 
of the term. What is perhaps even more interesting, however, is that 
Pennzoil never even seriously contested the filing. They made some 
noises about impropriety, but when the time came, they never pressed 
the issue. It is interesting to speculate on why not. One possibility is 
that the lawyers decided the issue was a loser and that their energies 
were better deployed elsewhere - though this begs the question, be-
cause it offers no explanation as to just why the issue was such a loser 
in such a novel case. From informal conversations, I gather that 
Pennzoil lawyers also took note of Texaco's deteriorating cash flow 
(even though its ultimate solvency was still indisputable) and that this 
gave color to the proposition that Texaco should be treated as bank-
rupt in an old-fashioned "unable-to-pay-debts-as-they-mature" 
sense. 84 On the facts, this was probably a stretch, and in any event, 
there is no suggestion of any such requirement for a voluntary petition 
in the Bankruptcy Code. 
Another possible inference is that the Texas case was going for-
ward in - well, Texas. The bankruptcy case went forward in New 
Rochelle. From Texaco's standpoint, the advantage was obvious: it 
had taken a pounding in the Texas courts, and any alternative was . 
bound to look good. But from Pennzoil's point of view there also may 
have been an advantage. The New Rochelle bankruptcy court was 
home - home in the sense that it was just a hop, skip, and jump from 
the caverns of Wall Street, which the investment bankers and lawyers 
on both sides claimed as their natural turf. But it is not just mileage at 
issue here: plane fare to Houston is pocket change in a megacase, and 
the chances are you can bill portal to portal. This is home in the 
chicken soup sense - home with the picket fence and the clinging ivy 
and the freckle-faced kid next door. Everybody knew there was going 
to be a deal somewhere. But the deal makers on both sides felt com-
fortable working out of the bankruptcy court in New Rochelle. 
In other words, the Texaco situation was distinctive, but no one 
troubled to raise the issue because it suited everyone's convenience to 
treat it as an ordinary case. For reasons like this I would stress, even 
more strongly than Delaney does, that bankruptcy seems to be passing 
out of its historic place and into the armory of general litigation tac-
tics. To lump it with labor cases and mass tort cases seems to me only 
to obscure the issue. If Texaco is the wave of the future, then we are in 
a different world indeed. 
This helps to shift the focus onto another issue that is manifest but 
not really delineated in all the works I have discussed before: the role 
of the professionals - particularly the lawyers. One who does articu-
late this point with a vengeance is Sol Stein, in his account of his own 
encounter with the practice (and the personnel) of bankruptcy law. 
84. See JAMES A. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 54-55 (1956). 
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I would like to make Stein's little book required reading for all of 
my law students - at least all my bankruptcy students - but not 
necessarily for the reasons Stein would want. Stein's core narrative is 
an account of the collapse of the firm he controlled, the publishing 
house of Stein & Day, Inc. His more general purpose is to expose the 
wickedness and knavery of almost every professional in the bank-
ruptcy system. Through it all, Stein pictures himself- and thinks he 
is presenting himself - as a poor victimized lamb taken out for the 
slaughter. To my taste, he is mostly pompous. He recalls with relish 
how he answered a question he did not like on deposition by saying, 
"Mr. Barri, when you've been in Who's Who for thirty years you can 
talk to me that way and not until then" (p. 168). It is a measure of his 
lack of self-insight that he repeats this story with pleasure and pride. 
From one perspective, then, Stein could serve as a useful reminder 
to my (fairly well-cossetted) students of just what they will be up 
against when they go out and undertake to make money by solving 
other people's problems. The devil of it is, of course, that even people 
like Stein deserve justice. Or more precisely, they need adequate rep-
resentation, a decent day's pay for a decent day's work. And even 
taking account of the breathtaking skew that he gives to his story, the 
evidence seems pretty strong that he did not get it. 
My best guess - it is only that - is that Stein's business never 
should have gone into chapter 11 in the first place. Or at any rate, he 
should not have gone in there without a decent shot at an out-of-court 
workout (which does not seem to have taken place) or with some sense 
of what his possibilities and limitations might have been (which he 
does not seem to have had). That kind of realism, it seems to me, 
would have been an essential prerequisite to anything like a successful 
rebound, and Stein, so full of self-delighting certainty of his own posi-
tion and the knavery and foolishness of his enemies, seems clearly not 
to have had it. 
Some people do go forward armed with that kind of good luck and 
good planning. The chief irony of all this is that Stein seems to know 
it and even, at one level, to understand it. In addition to giving you his 
own account, Stein tells you the stories of others who negotiated chap-
ter 11 with far more success than he - Sam Metzger, for example, of 
Chipwich (a kind of ice cream sandwich) (pp. 125-27 passim) or 
Thomas Towey of Neptune World Wide Moving and Storage (pas-
sim). Stein tells their stories well, and they are happy stories about a 
couple of guys with the resiliency and realism to carry themselves 
through troubled times. 
But Stein, who seems to have a certain amount of creative or en-
trepreneurial flair, does not appear to recognize that these essentials of 
survival simply elude him. But if he did not know, one reason he did 
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not is that plenty of people around him were ready to take his money 
without telling him. And more than that. Through it all, you can see 
that plenty of people make money off this system. Sometimes, per-
haps, they do their jobs well, sometimes badly; often enough it is hard 
to tell which. But they never seem to go to bed hungry. It is a small 
episode, of course - pathetic, although probably not as portentous as 
Stein makes it. But it gets under your skin. You go beyond Stein. 
You pick up the Wall Street Journal and read about the Revco case, 
where the professionals have been knocking down some $2 million a 
month.85 You find even Judge Merhige in Robins, that most aggres-
sive and refractory of reorganization judges, speaking almost with de-
spair about his capacity to cap fees. 86 
And you cannot avoid a twinge of bad conscience. It is compli-
cated, of course. I have had my own taste of bankruptcy practice and 
I must say it is, in its own way, damn hard work - very high pres-
sure, with a lot of sheer foolishness and sheer tedium. I have been 
stiffed by clients; I have given the little lecture that says if this case is a 
success I will probably ask for more money, and if it is a failure, I will 
probably take a loss. I have no principled objection to making money 
off other people's misfortune: otherwise what would we do for oncolo-
gists? I know that bankruptcy lawyers deserve competitive wages87 
and that if you do not attract good people to the field blah blah blah. 88 
The devil of it is, I suspect, that you are never quite sure whether 
the system is working well or not. My Uncle Perley used to carry 
buckeyes to ward off arthritis. He would say that he never knew how 
bad the arthritis would be if he did not carry the buckeyes. Bank-
ruptcy judges, in my experience, feel a bit the same way. Insofar as 
85. George Anders, Revco Saga: Or How Buy-Out Bonanza Became a Frenzy of Fees in 
Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1991, at Cl. 
86. BACIGAL, supra note 15, at 63. 
87. From the standpoint of the bankruptcy bar, the most valuable pieces of paper in recent 
history must be pages 329 and 330 of the House Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act, H.R. 
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 329-30 (1977), where the scrivener undertakes to defend a 
principle of "comparable worth" for bankruptcy lawyers, and in particular, to denounce the 
remarkable old case of In re Beverly Crest Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 548 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 
1976). In Beverly Crest, the judge did not see why a bankruptcy lawyer should earn any more 
than - well, any more than a judge. 548 F.2d at 821 (holding fees averaging $85 per hour 
grossly excessive). The imagination seizes up on trying to picture what life would look like if that 
standard obtained today. 
88. Or you read the interesting and useful fee survey produced by the American Bankruptcy 
Institute. See AMERICAN BANKR. INST., NATIONAL REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL COMPENSA-
TION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES (G.R. Warner rep. 1991) [hereinafter ABI REPORT]. The report 
offers 13 recommendations. Id. at xii-xix. The first recommendation was that courts limit the 
frequency with which trustees represent themselves. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 327(d) 
(1988). The next two sought to limit the role of the U.S. Trustee in policing fee requests. ABI 
REPORT at xiii-xiv. Nowhere is there any suggestion that the authors - or anyone else, for that 
matter - believe fees are in any general sense excessive. 
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they are obliged to police fee requests, 89 they know they ought to do 
something to get control of things; but they often find great difficulty 
identifying just how, or what. Lawyer Snerd asks the court to approve 
compensation of $1 million for 20 minutes work. He says that without 
him, creditors would have lost an extra $20 million. And he just 
might be right. Stuck without any really compelling standard, many 
judges probably feel, in their heart of hearts, that they let too much get 
by.90 There is a wonderful story in Los Angeles about the judge from 
Hell. In one case, he hauled everyone into court and threw a tantrum 
about excessive compensation; then he chopped the photocopy charges 
and left the hourly billings intact.91 
Not everyone is so misguided, of course. Some judges evidently 
are getting more aggressive in fee-policing.92 For whatever reason, my 
intuition tells me they are more willing to take a stand on what is 
permissible or impermissible in bankruptcy cases, and to fix fees ac-
cordingly. They are giving more thought to the issue, trying to de-
velop defensible principles for consistent administration of the bar 
from the bench. In a sense, this is good news. When I was a begin-
ning judge, I went to baby judges' school. I remember Lloyd George, 
now on the federal trial bench in Las Vegas, insisting "they're only as 
good as you make them be" - meaning that any conscientious judge 
has an obligation to police the bar. But this presents a difficulty. The 
more a judge asserts herself in fee matters, the more she becomes an 
adversary to the lawyers before her - the more, that is, she loses the 
quality of detachment and impartiality that most distinctively qualifies 
her to be a judge. 
Who will help her avoid this peril? Not the attorneys and profes-
sionals who practice before her. They have far too much at stake in 
the system as it stands. Ideally, she might get some support from the 
U.S. Trustee, with his broad obligation to supervise bankruptcy cases. 
And I suspect the U.S. Trustee system, on balance, does more to help 
her than to get in her way. But I would not expect much of it. The 
appointments to the critical U.S. trusteeships seem to me too closely 
linked to cronyism, too little linked to anything remotely resembling 
merit. At the staff level, matters are perhaps a bit better. But unfortu-
89. They do not control everyone's fees, of course. But cf. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 329, 330 (1988). 
90. In a small body of case law, courts have cut fees on a finding of excessive or wasteful 
work. See, e.g., Pope v. Knostman (In re Lee), 884 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Dalton, 95 
B.R 857 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989), affd., 101 B.R. 820 (M.D. Ga. 1989); In re Easter, 105 Bankr. 
724 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989). Just as an impressionistic matter, most cases of this sort seem to 
involve relatively small numbers and relatively small estates. Of course, the level of incompe· 
tence might be highest here, as well. 
91. Word of mouth. 
92. See, e.g., Michele Galen & Tim Smart, Kiss Those Three-Star Lunches Goodbye, Bus. 
WK., Sept. 30, 1991, at 60 (discussing the increasing willingness of judges to limit attorney fees in 
bankruptcy cases). 
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nately the staff lawyer, even if competent and well-intentioned, is 
likely to be a relative beginner with little or no experience in private 
practice, lacking the gravitas and the sheer wile he might need to do 
his job well. 
And an extra source of concern emerges that is not fully articu-
lated in any of this material - that is, as bankruptcy becomes more 
"strategic," as Delaney calls it, more and more a matter of every day, 
we approach more of an institutionalized revolution. In the old days, 
they used to talk about the "bankruptcy ring." These days, it is much 
more like a fully articulated culture with, as Nietzsche says, its own 
feast days and its own days of mourning. It has folk heroes galore, not 
only in the bar,93 but also judges,94 investment bankers,95 liquida-
tors,96 "turnaround specialists,"97 and others.98 Thus it is fast taking 
on the character of a regularized process - an institutionalized 
revolution. Some will regret this. Some find this process fun only 
when it is "exceptional," outside the rules, the class that does not con-
tain itself. The very regularity of it all will tempt them to move on, 
like Daniel Boone at the sound of his neighbor's axe. But you can 
assuage your nostalgia with a consolation: society needs its "excep-
tional" category. If bankruptcy does become regularized, then we will 
have to invent something else to fill its void. Where (for example) is 
the chapter 11 for chapter 11 debtors - that is, how to handle a rash 
of insolvent chapter 11 estates? For present purposes, though, I am 
adverting to another kind of problem: the thing about any self-perpet-
uating social institution is that it will continue if there is a need for it, 
and will continue anyway, even if there is not. 
93. See The National All-Stars in Bankruptcy, NATL. L.J., Apr. 2, 1990, at 28 (identifying 
Harvey R. Miller, Leonard M. Rosen, and Bernard Shapiro as the three top practitioners 
nationally). 
94. It is impossible to read the Conference News, the house organ of the National Conference 
of Bankruptcy Judges, without being struck by the sense of elan and conviviality that marks 
pride of craft in any endeavor. 
95. See Alison L. Cowan, A Bankruptcy Wizard's Coups, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at Dl 
(interview with investment banker Wilbur L. Ross, Jr.); Stuart Silverstein, Carter Hawley's Ad-
viser a ''Bulldog" Facing Biggest Test, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at Dl (interview with invest-
ment banker Jeffrey Chanin). 
96. James F. Peltz, New Growth Industry: Liquidators of Failed Retailers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 1990, at D17. 
97. A few years ago, the very name would have been enough to conjure up Ben Hecht's 
definition of a "starlet" - any woman in Hollywood under 50, not permanently employed in a 
brothel. Today, there is a Turnaround Management Association, complete with its own Code of 
Ethics. See Jim Mayer, Ethical Considerations in Turnaround Management, FAULKNER & 
GRAY'S BANKR. L. REv., Winter 1991, at 57. 
98. The trade's major interest group, the American Bankruptcy Institute, is less than a dozen 
years old, but it is already a dominant force in setting the agenda on bankruptcy issues. An older 
group, the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC), an invitation-only limited-membership 
group, functions as the "American Law Institute" of the bankruptcy bar. For a generation prior 
to the 1978 Code, the NBC functioned as virtually the sole purveyor of establishment profes-
sional wisdom on bankruptcy matters. Its influence today is less clear. 
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"Tell me why you are weeping and groaning in your heart," the 
poet asks, and then, as poets do, he answers his own question: "It was 
the gods who brought it about: they spun destruction for those people, 
so that future generations might have a song."99 Can that be right? It 
is a good story, yes, but is that all? Al1?100 Are Kellman and Delaney 
and Stein just the bards of our time, warming us around the campfire 
with tales of the heroes of not-so-long ago, until we disintegrate in a 
chemical stupor or brain them with a rock? Well, one hopes not. One 
hopes that there are lessons to be drawn, reforms to be fashioned and 
carried through. But one hesitates to place too much hope in all this. 
Rather, one suspects that if there are lessons to be drawn, they are 
something like this: first, it is a system that does not work terribly 
well; and second, it is one in which the people who ruIJ. the system do 
very well indeed. This, I suspect, is a point that underlies Stein's bit-
terness, Kallen's sardonic good cheer, and Delaney's fascinated 
revulsion. 
Were a cook to cook a fly, they say, he would save the breast for 
himself. But he would not settle for mere fly qua fly. No, he would 
tuck a little dried tomato under the skin; he would top it off with a bit 
of basil and maybe a dash of Dijon mustard, and serve it with some 
nice baby red potatoes and a side of baked eggplant. And if you, with 
your nose pressed against the window, complained that he was eating 
while you were hungry he would tell you how hard he had to work for 
it, how he did not get one often and how, after all, it was only a fly. 
Well, yes, even in flies, context is everything: time flies like an arrow, 
they say. Fruit flies like a banana. I once saw a headline that read: 
"Flies to receive Nobel Prize." The bankruptcy lawyers live very well 
off this system. The judges and professors don't live quite so well, 
usually. They do not get the big bucks and the perks, but they do have 
their pensions and their dental plans. They are not necessarily rapa-
cious at heart. Quite the contrary. They (we?) are quick to tell you 
they work hard for their money and perhaps they do. Does the system 
need a change? The point is, in a fundamental sense, they would never 
know it: the refulgent glow of their own comfort is bound to blind 
them to the light of any real reform. Or if they did get a glimpse of it 
every now and then, they would lose sight of it again when their eyes 
got weary and their stomachs began to whine. Better to leave all that 
for another day - it is too much work, and it is too complex, and it is 
not at all clear that one knows what to do. Better to kick back and 
tum up the stereo and tuck into a generous portion of fly. Yum! 
99. 8 HOMER, ODYSSEY lines 577-80, translated in 24 HOMER, ILIAD 6 (C.W. Macleod ed., 
1982). 
100. Cf. STANLEY ELKIN, THE LIVING END 144 (1979) (quoting God's explanation of why 
he did it: "Because it makes better story is why."). 
